Abstract. Recently Qian et al. [38] have proposed a new attack for RFID systems, called counting attack, where the attacker just aims to estimate the number of tagged objects instead of steal the tags' private information. They have stated that most of the existing RFID mutual authentication protocols are vulnerable to this attack. To defend against counting attack, they propose a novel Anti-Counting Security Protocol called ACSP. The designers of ACSP have claimed that their protocol is resistant against counting attack and also the other known RFID security threats. However in this paper we present the following efficient attacks against this protocol:
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems consist of a reading device called reader and one or more tags. The reader is a powerful device which can read/modify the tag's information. Tags are very constraint devices that range from passive tags, which respond only at reader commands, to active tags, which have an on-board power supply.
The design of secure authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags has received the attention of a lot of researchers, though many protocols have been published lately [1, 4, 6-12, 15-19, 21, 22, 27, 28, 30-37] . However, most of them have not satisfied the claimed security goles [1-3, 5, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23-30] . The security of an RFID protocol can be analyzed in several direction. For example, an adversary may be interested in tracking the tag holder which can compromise the tag holder privacy or it may try to clone a legitimate tag to pay less. We can classify the main known attacks in the field of RFID as follows:
-Forgery attacks that include:
• Tag impersonation • Reader impersonation -Secret disclosure attacks that include:
• Reader's secret values, e.g. shred key, disclosure attack • Tag's secret values, e.g. tag's ID, disclosure attack -De-synchronization attacks -Traceability attacks -Cloning attacks -Replay attacks Recently, Qian et al. have proposed a new attack, called counting attack, in which the adversary's target is to estimate the number of tagged objects. They have stated that most of the existing RFID protocols are vulnerable to counting attack. In addition, to defend against this attack, they have proposed a new protocol entitled ACSP [38] . Qian et al. have claimed that ACSP is secure against counting attack and also against the other attacks in the context. However, we show that their claims do not hold.
Paper Contributions: In this paper we show three kinds of attacks against ACSP. The first attack is the tag impersonation attack which is able to forces the reader to authenticate the adversary as a legitimate tag. The second attack is a de-synchronization attack which is able to de-synchronize the communication between the tag and the reader and the third attack is a traceability attack which is able to trace tags and compromise the privacy of the tag holder. The success probability of all attacks is "1", the complexity of any given attack is at most two runs of protocol and the main computation cost of any attack is at most one calculation of hash function and one calculation of CRC function.
Paper Organization: The notations used in the paper are presented in Section 2. The ACSP protocol is briefly described in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our impersonation attack which can be considered as de-synchronization attack also. We present another desynchronization attack which is de-synchronize a single tag and the reader in Section 5. In Section 6, we present another de-synchronization which de-synchronizes all tages in the range. Traceability attack is described in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we use the following notations:
RFID reader.
RFID tag.
The session identifier.
The current session identifier.
The new session identifier used in the following communication session.
The current unique identifier of tag.
The next identifier of tag used in the following communication session.
Pseudo random numbers that are generated by the reader or the tag.
One way hash function with variables x 1 and x 2 .
• CRC:
Cyclic Redundancy Code.
Bit mask.
Exclusive-or operation.
Adversary.
• M SG H EADER: Header of message which indicates the type of the message, including Select, Query, Identification, Authentication and End commands.
• SELECT : Select command.
Query command.
identification message from tag, containing T ID information.
• AU T HEN :
Authentication message.
• U ERY REP :
End current slot command.
• QU ERY ADJU ST : End current slot command.
Each message which is sent from the reader to the tag or wise versa includes a M SG H EADER, the message body and the CRC of the message. The M SG H EADER can be SELECT , QU ERY , IDEN T , AU T HEN , U ERY REP or QU ERY ADJU ST .
ACSP Description
Recently Qian et al. [38] have proposed a new attack for RFID system which has been called counting attack. The attacker's goal in counting attack is to estimate the number of tagged objects instead of stealing private information of tags. They have stated [38] that most of the existing RFID mutual authentication protocols are vulnerable to counting attack. To defend against this attack, they have proposed a novel anti-counting security protocol or in short term called ACSP [38] . In this section we present a brief description of ACSP. ACSP is composed of two phases: SID Update and Tag Identification that described separately in below:
SID Update Phase: This phase of protocol, which is depicted in Fig.2 , accomplishes as below: 1. The reader generates two random numbers R 1 and R 2 and sends (U P DSID, R 1 , R 2 , H(R 1 , SID cur ), CRC) to the tag. 
Tag Impersonation Attack
Tag impersonation attack is a forgery attack in which the reader accepts a spoofed tag as a legitimate tag. Any secure RFID authentication protocols must resistance against all kind of forgery attacks, include tag impersonation attack. In this section, we prove that ACSP is vulnerable to tag impersonation attack. In our tag impersonation attack, to impersonate the tag T i the adversary (A) can follow the bellows steps: 
T ID).
So the reader authenticates adversary as a legitimate tag and updates tag's T ID. The success probability of above attack is "1" and the complexity is only two successive runs of protocol. We emphasis that, as it has been indicated in the attack, on Phase 2 of the attack the adversary does not need to wait for an special session of protocol between R and the target tag T i to impersonate T i but it can impersonate T i on any run of protocol after Phase 1 of attack, where the adversary retrieves T ID of T i .
Remark 1.
After the successful run of the given tag impersonation attack, the reader authenticates the adversary as a legitimate tag and updates tag's T ID while the legitimate tag has not updated its T ID. Hence, the reader and the legitimate tag will not authenticate each other anymore in the following transactions. Therefore, the given impersonation attack leads to desynchronization attack.
Remark 2.
To overcome the potential de-synchronization attack because of the message lost problem occurring in the tag identification procedure, designers suggested [38, Sec. 6 ] that the reader preserves a copy of T ID used in the last successful identification for each tag. However, this modification also does not improve the security of the protocol against the proposed attack.
5
Single Tag De-synchronization Attack
In de-synchronization attack, the adversary forces the tag and the reader to update their common values to different values from each other. If the adversary can be succeed in forcing the tag and the reader to do so, they will not authenticate each other in the further transactions. Qian et al. [38] have stated that it is possible to desynchronize the tag and the reader in ACSP if the adversary block the transferred message from the reader to the tag in step 5b and to solve the problem , as an enhanced protocol, they suggested [38, Sec. 6 ] that the reader preserves a copy of T ID used in the last successful identification for each tag. However, in section 4 we have described a powerful tag impersonation attack which also desynchronize the target tag and the reader in their original and enhanced protocols. In this section, we present a different de-synchronization attack against the original protocol which is not follow Qian et al.'s suggestion to attack the protocol. Our de-synchronization attack is rather simple and it is based on this fact that in step 3 of the ACSP protocol the random number R 5 does not effect any part of the transfered message, except the CRC value. Hence, if an adversary A changes R 5 and CRC properly, there is now way for the tag to understand the modification. We use this observation in our de-synchronization attack against ACSP. In this attack, A does as follows:
-A lets step 1 and step 2 of protocol to be run without any change.
-A intercepts the message of step 3 of protocol and changes the value of R 5 to some arbitrary value, i.e. R 5 ⊕ ∆, and computes the corresponding CRC of (IDEN T , R 5 ⊕ ∆, H(R 4 , T ID)) denoted by CRC ′ . Then it sends (IDEN T , R 5 ⊕ ∆, H(R 4 , T ID), CRC ′ ) to the reader. -The reader authenticates the man in the middle adversary as a legitimate tag. Then R updates tag's T ID as T ID new = H(R 4 ⊕ R 5 ⊕ ∆, T ID).
It must be noted that the reader updates the tag's T ID by R 5 ⊕ ∆ while the tag does not update its T ID so they cannot authenticate each other in the following transactions. The success probability of above attack is "1" and the complexity is only one run of protocol.
6
Group De-synchronization Attack
In this section we introduce an attack which is desynchronized all tags in the range. It must be noted that in ACSP the reader and tags share the session identifier, SID. This value gets updated periodically following the SID Update Phase 3 of protocol. However, if an adversary forces the tag to updates its SID new to a different value compared to the value in the reader side, then the Tag Identification Phase 3 of protocol can not be run properly and the tag and the reader will be desynchronized. In addition, in SID Update Phase of protocol, all tags must update their SID, otherwise they will lost their synchronization with the reader. On the other hand, to update SID, the reader generates two random numbers R 1 and R 2 and sends (U P DSID, R 1 , R 2 , H(R 1 , SID cur ), CRC) to tags. Each tag, upon receipt of the message, checks the values of H(R 1 , SID cur ) and CRC and if it is valid it updates local SID as SID new = H(R 1 ⊕ R 2 , SID cur ). It can be seen that the adversary A can do as follows:
1. A intercepts the message, 2. changes R 2 to R ′ 2 = R 2 , 3. calculates the CRC ′ = CRC(U P DSID, R 1 , R 2 , H(R 1 , SID cur )), 4. and broadcasts (U P DSID, R 1 , R 2 , H(R 1 , SID cur ), CRC) to all tags in the range.
Obviously, the modified message will pass the tags verification test and all tags in the range will update their SID to SID new = H(R 1 ⊕ R ′ 2 , SID cur ). Since with a high probability H(R 1 ⊕ R 2 , SID cur ) = H(R 1 ⊕ R ′ 2 , SID cur ) (the exact probability is 1 − 2 −n where n is length of SID in bits), all tags are desynchronized from the reader. The success probability of above attack is almost "1" and the complexity is only one run of protocol.
Remark 3. It must be noted that the designers have discussed [38, Sec. 6 ] that the the tag and the reader will be de-synchronized if tag does not receive the U P DSID command. To overcome this problem they suggested any tag to send a update acknowledge command as (U P DACK, R2, CRC) to the reader. However, this message can be generated by the adversary and sent to the reader because it does not include any secret parameter. Therefore, the enhanced protocol is also vulnerable to the given attack.
Traceability Attack
In this section we show how ACSP puts at stake the location privacy of tags' holders because tags can be tracked with a high probability. Specifically, adversary is given a target tag T i which is supposed to trace. Later, a random tag T j is given to A and the adversary should verify whether it is T i . It output its decision as a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}, 0 for to T j = T 1 and 1 for to T j = T 1 cases. A's success in winning the traceability game G is equivalent to the success of breaking the untraceability property offered by the protocol. So the advantage of A in distinguishing whether the messages correspond to T i or not is defined as below:
where q is a security parameter (i.e. the bit length of the key shared between the tag and the reader) and kr is the number of times A runs the protocol. Our traceability attack is described as below:
Phase 1: Learning , in this phase of attack the adversary de-synchronize T i and R. In addition, though the de-synchronization attack it can achive the required information to trace T i later. 1. A desynchronize T i and R following the given tag impersonation attack which also leads to de-synchronization(refer to 1) and store the following messages transfered between R to T i , include: 
In the given attack, the adversary desynchronize the reader and the target tag T i at the first phase of attack. Hence, T i will not update its secret parameters include SID and T ID. On the other hand, as long as SID and T ID are fixed, the eavesdropped values in the Learning phase of attack are pass the tags verification tests in the protocol and the adversary will expect the same H(R 4 , T ID) from the tag to be included in its IDEN T command. Hence, if T i = T j then with the probability of "1" we have H(R 4 , T ID) == H(R 4 , T ID ′ ). However, if T i = T j then with a negligible probability H(R 4 , T ID) == H(R 4 , T ID ′ ). This probability is less than 2 −n , where n is the output length of hash function, H(.). Therefore, the success probability of adversary to output the correct b is lower bounded by 1 − 2 −n . Hence, the adversary advantage in wining the game is as follows, which is almost the maximum of possible advantages:
The total complexity of attack is "3" runs of protocol, two runes in Learning phase and one run in Challenge phase of attack.
Conclusion
In this paper we considered the ACSP, UHF RFID mutual authentication protocol. Based on its designers' climes this protocol is supposed to resist counting attack and the other known attacks against an RFID system. However, we presented several efficient attack against this protocol with high success probability. Our attacks include tag impersonation attack, single tag de-synchronization attack, group of tags de-synchronization attack and traceability attack. The success probability of all attacks are almost "1" and the complexity are at most three runs of the protocol. Hence, ACSP is not a secure protocol for an ordinary applications of RFID systems.
